Our voting intentions for 2026

Our investment stewardship activities are focussed on supporting the creation of long-term sustainable value for our clients. We believe that exercising voting rights is an important part of this process, and of being a good steward of our clients’ assets more generally.

Sometimes, we may choose to declare our vote intention ahead of meetings, to clarify our views to the market, clients and other companies to a particular issue, resolution or outcome. The decision to do so can be undertaken where we deem the vote to be particularly contentious, or as part of an engagement programme. 

Over 2026, we will be updating this blog on a regular basis to highlight our vote intentions in advance of certain shareholder meetings. For information about our voting actions and rationales, please visit our dedicated website: VDS Dashboard   

More information about our Investment Stewardship activities, policies and engagement activities can be found on our website: Investment stewardship & governance | LGIM Institutional   

 

BP Plc 

Meeting:

AGM, 23 April 2026 

Summary of resolutions:  

Resolution 4: To elect Albert Manifold as a director 

Resolution 22: New Articles of Association 

Resolution 23: Revocation of resolution 25 (2015) and resolution 22 (2019) 

Resolution 24: Shareholder requisitioned resolution  

Voting intention: Against Resolutions 4, 22 & 23; and For Resolution 24 (i.e. against management recommendations)   

As long-term investors, L&G’s independent investment stewardship team engage with companies on a range of issues which have the potential to be financially material to the future success of a company over a range of time horizons. This is part of our fiduciary duty to protect and create long-term shareholder value for our clients. The availability of decision-useful data and information to investors, and the opportunity to constructively engage, is crucial to these processes. 

As with other oil and gas companies, BP is exposed to the dynamics of the energy transition, as well as nearer-term market volatility linked to energy supply. Appropriate disclosures and insights into financially material topics such as business strategy, climate transition plans, and capital allocation are particularly critical for shareholders to understand how the company is mitigating potential risks and addressing long-term value-creation opportunities associated with the energy transition.  

We acknowledge BP’s engagement with us over recent weeks across the Resolutions tabled at their upcoming AGM. Our voting intentions reflect our ongoing concerns that management recommendations, together with other recent actions including, notably, the non-admittance of the Follow This shareholder resolution, represent a reduction in transparency and constrain the ability of shareholders to understand and price risks associated with energy transition, by limiting both disclosures and opportunities for shareholders to engage directly with the Board. 

Resolution 4: To elect Albert Manifold as a director  

We are concerned that, in combination, management’s recommendations on Resolutions 22, 23 and 24 will have a negative impact on shareholders’ insight into how the company is addressing financially material long-term risks, and seizing long-term value creation opportunities, associated with the energy transition. We are also concerned by the precedent set by the company’s decision not to admit the Follow This shareholder resolution.

Taken together, we believe these actions reduce transparency and Board accountability and, in the case of the non admittance of a shareholder resolution, compromise established shareholder rights. Given the Chair’s ultimate responsibility for these areas, we accordingly intend to vote against the Chair’s election. 

Resolution 22: New Articles of Association 

We view Annual General Meetings as providing an important mechanism by which a board is held publicly accountable to all its shareholders, both institutional and retail. The attendance of the Board at such meetings is a demonstration of its commitment to hear and understand the views of shareholders, and as such an important mechanism for accountability. 

While we recognise BP’s objective to ‘simplify and modernise’ the Articles and to provide flexibility on meeting format, we will be voting against this resolution on the basis that the current wording implies that the Board has indefinite authority over whether and when to enable virtual-only shareholder meetings.  

We understand that the UK government is expected to consult on the facilitation of virtual meetings and see it as prudent for the Board to wait for the consultation detail before it provides this discretion. We will therefore be voting against this resolution. 

Resolution 23: Revocation of resolution 25 (2015) and resolution 22 (2019) 

Whilst we agree with the company on the importance of comparable, mandatory reporting, we are voting against this resolution. This is because we believe that the company has not provided sufficient evidence to assure investors that these revocations would not result in the loss of financially material disclosures, that we consider essential to understanding the business strategy. More specifically, if this revocation were to proceed, we would be concerned about the potential omission of the following key disclosures: 

• A description of a strategy which the Board considers, in good faith, to be consistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement.  
• Disclosure of how the company evaluates the consistency of each new material capex investment with the Paris Goals and a range of other outcomes relevant to BP’s strategy.
• Public policy positions related to climate change.  

Given the long-term challenges facing all oil and gas companies such as BP, including the financially material impact of potential stranded assets and the impact of rising volatility in energy markets, we consider disclosures such as these as essential for investors to accurately assess climate‑related risks and opportunities, the resilience of the business across a range of energy transition scenarios, and the credibility and delivery of the company’s climate commitments in the context of its overall strategy.  

Resolution 24: Shareholder requisitioned resolution   

Whilst we acknowledge that BP has disclosed elements of the information sought, we will be supporting this shareholder resolution. Given the increased focus of investments into the upstream business, we believe that the proposed disclosures will allow shareholders to better assess whether and how the company’s investment decision-making promotes a disciplined approach to capital allocation. We would welcome the opportunity to engage with BP on the form of disclosure that would appropriately meet the resolution’s requirements. 

 

Articles of Incorporation resolutions: Korean Corporate Governance reform 

Meeting:  

LG Energy Solution, Meeting: AGM, 20-03-2026 

LG Electronics, Inc, Meeting: AGM 23-03-2026 

SK Hynix Inc, Meeting: AGM, 26-03-2026 

Hyundai Motor Co, Ltd, Meeting: AGM, 26-03-2026 

Summary of resolution:  

During the upcoming March 2026 AGMs, Korean companies are expected to table a range of governance-related resolutions, including: 

•             Amendments to Articles of Incorporation, particularly in relation to cumulative voting, electronic shareholder meetings and director title change 

•             Director elections, including independent directors and audit committee members 

L&G’s Vote Intention:  FOR the above proposals (In line with management recommendations) 

1) Amendments to Articles of Incorporation 

We support amendments to the Articles of Incorporation that strengthen shareholder rights, including mandatory cumulative voting and hybrid AGMs, while assessing whether structural features materially dilute shareholder influence or engagement. Where effectiveness is undermined in practice, this may be reflected in our director votes. 

2) Director elections 

Director independence will be assessed in substance rather than by title alone, with concerns where tenure, skills, expertise, or relationships limit effective challenge. The amendments to the Korean Commercial Code implemented changes regarding the levels of independence on a board and the selection of audit committee members but allowed companies a grace period of one year, starting 23rd July 2026.  Therefore, for the upcoming voting season, votes will be assessed in line with the intent of the Articles amendments rather than treated as standalone compliance failures. We also expect audit committee reforms to deliver genuine oversight; where this is lacking, we may vote against relevant elections. 

Rationale:  

The upcoming March 2026 AGM season in Korea is the first concentrated proxy season following the latest reforms to the Commercial Act. These changes aim to strengthen shareholder participation and board oversight through measures such as cumulative voting, expanded fiduciary duties, and enhanced independence requirements.  

We are generally supportive of the reforms. As set out previously in What our voting record in South Korea says about gaps, we will continue to closely monitor how the changes are applied as a meaningful catalyst for strengthening board effectiveness, capital allocation discipline, or accountability to minority shareholders in the market.  

Deere & Company 

Meeting: AGM, 25-02-2026

Summary of resolution:

Resolution 4 – Report on Expected Return on Investment of Company's Emissions Reduction Goals

L&G's vote intention:  Against resolution 4 (i.e., in line with management recommendation)  

Rationale:

We aim to support long-term value creation by encouraging companies to realise the opportunities arising from the energy transition and demonstrate business resilience. We believe transparent climate reporting aligns with this objective and would therefore welcome Deere providing more company‑specific disclosure on how its climate commitments support long‑term financial performance.

However, in our view, the resolution is not drafted in a way that would meaningfully support improved disclosure. We recognise the proponent’s stated intent to link emissions goals to financial returns, but the resolution would be unlikely to enhance investor understanding and could potentially reframe decarbonisation as a narrow ROI accounting exercise rather than a strategic value driver. This risks undermining the progress Deere is already making.

We have been engaging Deere on clearer, value ‑linked sustainability reporting  – particularly around Scope 3 and how Deere’s technologies improve resource efficiency and climate performance for customers.  This should provide investors with more robust insight than the prescriptive report requested in this proposal. Deere has been receptive to our recommendations and has indicated willingness to enhance disclosure on specific key topics in their upcoming reporting. Given this progress, and the importance of recognising and using climate disclosures to strategically drive long-term value, we will vote against Resolution 4.

 

Edinburgh Worldwide Investment Trust plc

Meeting: EGM, 20 January 2026

Summary of resolutions: 

Resolutions 1-6 – remove six incumbent directors (the full board)

Resolutions 7-9 – appoint three nominees to the board

L&G’s vote intention:  Against all resolutions (i.e., in line with management recommendation)  

Rationale:

Saba Capital’s ask to appoint three nominees to replace the full existing board of Edinburgh Worldwide Investment Trust plc (‘EWIT’) lacks sufficient detail regarding its future strategy for the trust, vital and financially material information for investors which would be expected, given the substantial restructure of the trust’s board and handover of power to the nominees being proposed under resolutions 7-9. 

The dissident (Saba Capital) appears to have taken on board shareholder concerns raised during its previous campaign and has provided some information on the nominees’ skills and rationale for their appointment and or nomination process, considering each candidate independent. 

However, the incumbent EWIT board equally appears to have been responsive to the contention of underperformance and has effectively managed to reduce its discount to Net Asset Value (‘NAV’). Given the potential conflict of interests between Saba, its nominees, and long-term investors, we are therefore again voting against all proposals at the forthcoming meeting, opting to keep the running of EWIT in the hands of the incumbent board at this time.

Saba Capital is a US hedge fund that started campaigning for change in 2024 at a number of UK investment trusts that were deemed by the activist to underperform, with high discounts to NAV amongst the concerns cited. These activist campaigns resulted in requisitioned shareholder meetings at seven investment trusts[1] in early 2025, with Saba buying into each with varying substantial holdings. 

Upon review of the recent proposals at EWIT’s requisitioned meeting on 20 January 2026, Saba’s strategy appears broadly unchanged from its previous attempt at the shareholder meetings in February 2025. For more background, including our vote decisions at the time, please see page 19 of our Q1 2025 Quarterly engagement report.

Given the importance of the vote to the future of EWIT, as well as the likely tight vote with much of the outcome heavily relying on retail investors placing their votes during what is a quiet time of the year, we have chosen to pre-declare our vote intentions and have also recalled any shares out on loan to be able to vote on behalf of our clients with the full voting power attached to our holdings.

More information on our investment stewardship activities can be found on our website: Investment stewardship & governance | LGIM Institutional     

 
[1] Baillie Gifford US Growth Trust (USA), CQS Natural Resources Growth & Income (CYN), Edinburgh Worldwide Investment Trust (EWI), European Smaller Companies Trust (ESCT), Henderson Opportunities Trust (HOT), Herald Investment Trust (HRI) and Keystone Positive Change Investment Trust (KPC).